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Essay

F ighting Orthodoxy: Challenging Critical Race
Theory Bans and Supporting Critical Thinking
in Schools
Joshua Gutzmann*
National unity as an end which off icials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question . . . . Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country have been
waged by many good as well as by evil men . . . . Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon f ind themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unif ication of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. . . . If there is any f ixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no off icial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. —Justice Robert H. Jackson1
Orthodoxy means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness. —George Orwell2

INTRODUCTION
Fox News mentioned critical race theory (CRT) more than 1,900
times from April to mid-July of 2021,3 marking CRT as a new focus of

* Student, University of Minnesota Law School; Symposium Articles Editor,
Minnesota Law Review Volume 107; former teacher and lifelong educator. Many
thanks to Steve Kelley, whose guidance was invaluable, and my colleagues on the Minnesota Law Review—especially Dina Kostrow and Emilie Erickson—who have provided invaluable feedback and support to this Essay. Dedicated to my students, who
deserve to live in a world where their voice s are valued and of whom I am incredibly
proud. Copyright © 2022 by Joshua Gutzmann.
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–42 (1943).
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 68 (Planet E-books ed.), https://www.planetebook
.com/free-ebooks/1984.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CJ8-NHC4].
3. Lis Power & Rob Savillo, Fox News’ Obsession with Critical Race Theory, by the
Numbers, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (July 14, 2021), https://www.mediamatters.org/
fox-news/fox-news-obsession-critical-race-theory-numbers [https://perma.cc/T8Y3
-N7H4].
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Republicans and conservative donors4 and sparking a movement to
ban teaching of the theory in schools.5 Nine states have already passed
legislation intended to ban the teaching of CRT, and nineteen states
are considering similar legislation.6 The state school boards in four
additional states have introduced new guidelines prohibiting race-related discussions;7 and, by some counts, as many as twenty-four other
states have seen some kind of effort to restrict education on racism,
bias, or the history of some ethnic or racial groups.8 Several local
school boards have adopted their own bans,9 and federal bills have
4. See, e.g., The Daily, The School Board Wars, Part 2, N.Y. TIMES, at 21:05–42:31
(Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/17/podcasts/the-daily/school
-board-bucks-county.html [https://perma.cc/X7KE-FDU3] (interviewing one wealthy
conservative donor who describes a new focus on school board elections to build a
base of “apolitical people” who can be used for political advantage in future elections
and linking this focus on schools to elections to higher off ice such as the Virginia governor’s race in 2021).
5. See Power & Savillo, supra note 3.
6. See Rashawn Ray & Alexandra Gibbons, Why Are States Banning Critical Race
Theory?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/f ixgov/2021/07/
02/why-are-states-banning-critical-race-theory [https://perma.cc/9UDG-J3A2]. Legislation passed in Arizona is no longer in effect because it was overturned by the Arizona Supreme Court for violating the “single subject rule.” See Ariz. Sch. Boards Ass’n,
Inc. v. State, 501 P.3d 731 (Ariz. 2022).
Not all states explicitly state that their goal is to ban CRT or name CRT in their
legislation, but the intent of each state to ban what legislators view as CRT is clear in
each state’s legislation—whether explicitly named or not. For this reason, whenever I
use phrases such as “statutes that ban CRT” or “CRT bans,” I am referring both to statutes that explicitly name CRT as the intended target and to statutes that do not explicitly refer to CRT but have similar or identical legislative intent.
7. Ray & Gibbons, supra note 6.
8. See Cathryn Stout & Thomas Wilburn, CRT Map: Efforts to Restrict Teaching
Racism and Bias Have Multiplied Across the U.S., CHALKBEAT (Feb. 1, 2022),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/22525983/map-critical-race-theory-legislation-teaching
-racism [https://perma.cc/QYR9-HJP5].
9. See Kristal Dixon, Cobb County School Board Bans Teaching Critical Race Theory, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June 10, 2021), https://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-news/
cobb-county-school-board-bans-teaching-critical-race-theory/
WSPF6NAVZJC2PNPBAPD7SCXOXE [https://perma.cc/ESN2-VJNJ] (Cobb County,
GA); WSBTV.com News Staff, ‘Their Own Language Is Confusing:’ District Votes Against
Allowing Critical Race Theory, WSB ATLANTA (May 21, 2021), https://www.msn.com/
en-us/news/us/their-own-language-is-confusing-cherokee-co-school-board-votes
-against-adopting-critical-race-theory/ar-AAKdwYe [https://perma.cc/7EYG-6F7K]
(Cherokee County, GA); Port City Daily Staff, Brunswick School Board Passes Policy to
Prevent ‘Bias in Teaching,’ Ban Critical Race Theory, PORT CITY DAILY (June 10, 2021),
https://portcitydaily.com/local-news/2021/06/10/brunswick-school-board-passes
-policy-to-prevent-bias-in-teaching-ban-critical-race-theory [https://perma.cc/H54G
-XWRH ] (Brunswick County, NC); Madeline Mitchell, Why Did Gallatin County Schools
Ban Critical Race Theory? No One ‘Is Inherently Racist’, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (June 17,
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been introduced as well.10 Most of the legislation passed and proposed
mirrors language contained in an executive order by former-President Trump that attempted to ban specif ic concepts that many conservatives believe are being taught by radical leftist teachers.11
Though this order has been partially struck down by a federal court
as unconstitutionally vague,12 the state legislation remains.
Some principals and teachers pursuing educational best-practices for their students have already been f ired or forced to resign.13
And after less than two years, examples of widespread confusion and
fear among teachers are numerous—leading teachers to begin selfcensoring.14 Students are now genuinely at risk of being left with a
2021),
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2021/06/17/gallatin-county
-schools-superintendent-banning-critical-race-theory/7734193002 [https://perma
.cc/S36U-93SF] (Gallatin County, KY).
10. See Saving American History Act of 2021, H.R. 3810, 117th Cong. (2021); Ending Critical Race Theory in D.C. Public Schools Act, H.R. 3937, 117th Cong. (2021); Stop
CRT Act, S. 2346, 117th Cong. (2021); S. Con. Res. 14, 117th Cong. § 3024 (2021) (as
agreed to in the Senate, August 10, 2021, and in the House, August 24, 2021) (“prohibiting or limiting Federal funding from being used to promote critical race theory or
compel teachers or students to aff irm critical race theory in prekindergarten programs, elementary schools, and secondary schools”); Protect Equality and Civics Education (PEACE) Act, S. 2682, 117th Cong. (2021); Protecting Students from Racial Hostility Act, S. 2574, 117th Cong. (2021).
11. See Exec. Order No. 13,950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,683, 60,685 (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/28/2020-21534/combating
-race-and-sex-stereotyping [https://perma.cc/S47D-V7MZ].
12. See Santa Cruz Lesbian Gay Cmty. Ctr. v. Trump, 508 F. Supp. 3d 521, 543, 549
(2020). “Partially struck down” here is used as shorthand for the court having enjoined
enforcement of sections four and f ive of Executive Order 13,950, which apply the ban
to federal contractors and grantees.
13. See, e.g., Bianca Marais, Sullivan County School Board Approves Teacher Termination Charges, Supporters Outraged, WJHL (June 9, 2021), https://www.wjhl.com/
news/local/sullivan-county-teacher-facing-termination-at-school-board-meeting
-tuesday-supporters-to-gather [https://perma.cc/W7BF-U4EP] (teacher f ired for assigning Ta-Nehisi Coates article “The F irst White President” and showing a video of a
spoken-word poem by Kyla Lacey entitled “White Privilege” in his Contemporary Issues class); Antonia Hylton, Emily Berk, & Alicia Victoria Lozano, Texas Principal
Forced to Resign over Critical Race Theory, YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 10, 2021), https://news
.yahoo.com/texas-principal-forced-resign-over-005339525.html [https://perma.cc/
ZD9N-BG6F]; Hannah Natanson, A White Teacher Taught White Students About White
Privilege. It Cost Him His Job., WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/education/2021/12/06/tennessee-teacher-f ired-critical-race-theory/?utm_
source=instagram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wp_main&crl8_id=
da873819-1040-46d9-8244-946c5a2de8da [https://perma.cc/F4RC-KGDN].
14. See, e.g., Laura Meckler & Hannah Natanson, New Critical Race Theory Laws
Have Teachers Scared, Confused and Self-Censoring, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/02/14/critical-race-theory
-teachers-fear-laws [https://perma.cc/W2U3-DGC4].
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school environment devoid of cultural aff irmation that inadequately
supports development of critical reasoning skills. This movement is
more than a mere symbolic move in the ongoing culture wars as America struggles with its evolving identity and is forced to reckon with the
enduring legacy of racist policymaking. It will have signif icant consequences for the next generation.
This Essay begins by surveying the new legislation and describing the common features among each state’s CRT ban. It then provides
a broad overview of some potential constitutional challenges to the
legislation, including F irst Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges, and addresses the possibility of a justiciability defense. Focusing on the need to show harm to students—not just teachers—this
Essay next outlines two specif ic harms to students that have arisen or
are likely to arise from the legislation and from its chilling effect: harm
to culturally sustaining pedagogy and critical reasoning skills. F inally,
this Essay examines these harms by reviewing a portion of the literature on culturally sustaining pedagogy and examining how new social
studies standards in Minnesota—as a prototypical example of educational best-practices—might conf lict with anti-CRT legislation. This
discussion may serve as a starting point for litigators challenging CRT
legislation who need to articulate the harms caused by the legislation
and identify viable challenges.
I. THE LEGISLATION
Though much of the statutory text in anti-CRT legislation is uncontroversial—banning ideas that have been rejected by a supermajority of Americans—some prohibitions could present real issues for
educators if interpreted broadly. If courts interpret prohibitions using
the plain meaning of the statutory text, most of what the average educator teaches and discusses is not banned; but, if courts interpret the
prohibitions broadly, many state statutes may be read to ban even objective accounts of historical events involving conf lict along lines of
identity. Thus, at least until courts and administrative agencies have
def ined the banned concepts with more specif icity, the chilling effect
of the legislation alone presents strong disincentives to instruction on
important academic topics.15
15. This Essay does not suggest that CRT is an academic topic that should be
taught to K–12 students. Rather, this Essay is concerned primarily with students’ opportunity to learn about non-CRT topics that are clearly important for students to
learn, non-exhaustively: the history of communities of color and gender and sexual minorities; literature written by or about people of color and gender and sexual minorities; and social science research related to race, gender, and sexuality.
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A. BANNED IDEAS
Most of the actual statutory text describing the concepts that legislatures intend to ban should probably be uncontroversial even to
CRT supporters, so long as they are read literally. The Arizona statute
provides an appropriate example, as it includes a list of banned ideas
similar to most other states’ bans,16 and it mirrors the Trump administration’s executive order closely.17 It begins with a blanket ban on
“blame or judgment on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex,” and def ines
that phrase as:
1. One race, ethnic group or sex is inherently morally or intellectually superior to another race, ethnic group or sex.
2. An individual, by virtue of the individual’s race, ethnicity or sex, is inherently racist, sexist or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously.
3. An individual should be invidiously discriminated against or receive adverse treatment solely or partly because of the individual’s race, ethnicity or
sex.
4. An individual’s moral character is determined by the individual’s race, ethnicity or sex.
5. An individual, by virtue of the individual’s race, ethnicity or sex, bears responsibility for actions committed by other members of the same race, ethnic
group or sex.
6. An individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish or any other form of
psychological distress because of the individual’s race, ethnicity or sex.
7. Meritocracy or traits such as a hard work ethic are racist or sexist or were
created by members of a particular race, ethnic group or sex to oppress members of another race, ethnic group or sex.18

Even the most ardent CRT supporters are unlikely to take issue
with banning the teaching that many of these ideas are true. For example, CRT supporters certainly do not want students to think one
class of people is morally or intellectually superior or should be discriminated against because of their identity. Though ideas f ive, six,
and seven may come closer to actual beliefs of CRT proponents, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic—two of the foremost CRT proponents—list none of these ideas when describing the most critical tenets of CRT.19
16. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1494 (2021); see also IOWA CODE §§ 261H.8, 279.74
(2021) (containing a near-identical list); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(B)(1) (2021)
(same); H. 4100, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 124th Sess. § 1.105 (S.C. 2021) (same); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 193:40 (2021) (containing similar language).
17. See Exec. Order No. 13,950, supra note 11.
18. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1494(D) (2021).
19. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 7–10 (3d ed. 2013).
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The legislation, limited to banning the teaching of these ideas,
therefore does not actually ban the core tenets of CRT, namely that:
racism is ordinary and every day, White people benef it from racism
and thus have little incentive to eliminate it, race is a social construction, the ways different groups are racialized change over time, no person has a single unitary identity, and White people are unlikely to understand or communicate racism in the same way that it is
experienced by people of color.20 The only provision that, on its face,
comes close to a core CRT theory is a Tennessee provision banning the
concept that “[t]he rule of law does not exist, but instead is a series of
power relationships and struggles among racial or other groups . . . .”21
However, CRT supporters and educators who support educational best practices such as culturally sustaining pedagogy (who I call
“culturally sustaining educators”)22 may still take issue with a few
specif ic banned concepts. For example, CRT supporters may disagree
with banning the idea that a group member might bear some “responsibility” for the actions of members of their group because, interpreted
broadly, banning the idea suggests that group members bear no responsibility for the sins of the past—i.e., that White people have no
duty to eliminate the vestiges of racism. But this phrase on its face
does not ban teaching that there were in fact actions committed in the
past by members of a group. Likewise, banning the idea that “[a]n individual . . . is inherently racist, sexist or oppressive” does not facially
ban teaching examples of racist or sexist behavior or the history of
racist or sexist policymaking.
Thus, these concepts—so long as they are narrowly construed—
are probably unobjectionable even to CRT supporters. Yet, many statutes will not be interpreted narrowly.
B. AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS & PROVISIONS OPEN TO BROAD
INTERPRETATION
Some states appear to ban only intentionally instructing that a
concept is true, not that the concept exists and has motivated historical and contemporary policies and practices. For example, Idaho bans
20. See id.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(a)(12) (2021).
22. Culturally sustaining educators may or may not support CRT specif ically but
do support educational best practices that involve aff irming, exploring, and celebrating each student’s unique personality and background. Culturally sustaining education
and CRT should not be conf lated, which is why I refer to CRT supporters and culturally
sustaining educators separately. See Part III.A for more discussion of culturally sustaining pedagogy.
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“direct[ing] or otherwise compel[ling] students to personally aff irm,
adopt, or adhere to” the listed ideas.23 This seems to only ban advocating for those ideas or asking students to believe in the truth of them—
not to ban teaching that those beliefs have been held by others. New
Hampshire’s law bans teaching, “instruct[ing], inculcat[ing] or compel[ing] to express a belief in” each of the ideas and lists each concept
starting with the word “[t]hat.”24 In other words, New Hampshire’s
law only appears to ban teaching that the concept is true, not teaching
that concept exists in some people’s belief systems and in history.25
Other statutes are far more susceptible to broad interpretations
that do not require any intent and could punish teachers for merely
teaching that a concept exists without advocating for the truth of the
concept. South Carolina’s statute bans materials and practices “that
serve to inculcate any of the . . . concepts.”26 Though, initially, this
phrase appears narrow like New Hampshire and Idaho’s bans, common def initions of “inculcate” do not require any intent to cause a belief.27 Under a broad reading, the statute can be violated inadvertently.
If a child has developed a belief as a consequence of a teacher repeating that belief—even when not for the truth of the belief, but only to
demonstrate its existence—a teacher could plausibly be found guilty
for having inculcated the belief. But South Carolina’s law is only the tip
of the iceberg of ambiguity in CRT bans.
Some statutes are blatantly overbroad and confusing. The Oklahoma statute bans “requir[ing]” the banned concepts “or mak[ing
23. IDAHO CODE § 33-138(3)(a) (2021).
24. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:40 (2021).
25. As the next paragraph discusses, “inculcation” can likely happen inadvertently, lending the statute to broad interpretations that may punish teachers for merely
teaching that the idea exists. But New Hampshire’s statute remains narrow because it
includes language that clarif ies this ambiguity and constrains overbroad interpretations. See id. § 193:40(II) (“Nothing in this [statute] shall be construed to prohibit discussing, as part of a larger course of academic instruction, the historical existence of
ideas and subjects identif ied in this section.”). Further, because “inculcate” appears in
a list, the canon of construction noscitur a sociis likely applies to constrain interpretations of “inculcate” to be read similarly to “instruct” and “compel” which appear to require intent. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (applying
noscitur a sociis when interpreting a statute).
26. H. 4100, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 124th Sess. § 1.105 (S.C. 2021).
27. See, e.g., Inculcate, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
us/dictionary/english/inculcate [https://perma.cc/V5YV-XLUS] (“to f ix beliefs or
ideas in someone’s mind, especially by repeating them often”; “to cause someone to
have particular beliefs or values by repeating them frequently”); Inculcate, MERRIAM
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inculcate [https://perma
.cc/ACM5-B4R2] (“to teach and impress by frequent repetitions or admonitions”).
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them] part of a course.”28 Texas uses the language “require or make
part of a course.”29 The Arizona statute is also broad, banning “allow[ing] instruction in [the listed ideas] or mak[ing them] part of a
course.”30 Similarly, the Tennessee statute bans “includ[ing] or promot[ing] the . . . concepts.”31 Statutes that ban either “including” any
of the concepts or “making [any of the concepts] part of a course” are
overbroad and could result in the banning of just about any historical
event.
For example, one concept—that an individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or another form of psychological distress solely because of the individual’s race or sex—appears in at least f ive state statutes32 and is particularly open to a broad interpretation. A court may
reasonably hold that the statute covers any teaching of historical
events that might cause a student to feel uncomfortable or guilty.
Though, facially, it only bans teaching that an individual “should” feel
discomfort or anguish, a court could reasonably construe teaching a
historical event—especially using primary sources with higher emotional valence—as teaching that an individual should feel discomfort.
Though the teacher may not wish for students to feel discomfort or
guilt, a court or administrative adjudicator may f ind that a lesson with
the actual effect of engendering these feelings nevertheless taught
that students “should” feel that way.33 Of course, there also may be
important texts that more directly state that White students should
feel guilt for past and current wrongs, and these are even more likely
to be banned. This broad interpretation could have dire consequences
for educators wishing to teach even the most basic historic events that
shed the nation’s history in anything but a falsely rosy light.
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(B)(1) (2021).
29. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.0022(a)(4)(A) (West 2021).
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-717.02(B) (2021).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(a) (2021).
32. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(a)(6) (2021); H. 4100, 2021 Gen. Assemb.,
124th Sess. § 1.105(6) (S.C. 2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(B)(1)(g) (2021); IOWA
CODE § 261H.8(1)(c)(8) (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1494(D)(6) (2021).
33. But see Response of Defs. to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21, Black
Emergency Response Team v. O’Connor, No. 5:21-cv-01022 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2021),
ECF No. 61 [hereinafter BERT Response] (“The [Oklahoma] provision doesn’t prohibit
teaching lessons that might cause discomfort or psychological distress—it prohibits
teaching that a student ‘should’ feel discomfort or psychological distress ‘on account
of his or her race or sex.’ That is it. In other words, it condemns telling students they
should feel guilty for being of a certain race. There is an enormous gap between teaching, say, that slavery was an evil perpetrated mostly by white people (permissible) and
saying that a young child who is white ‘should’ feel distressed about slavery solely because she is white. Such basic distinctions are not diff icult or confusing.”).
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A similar analysis applies to a unique additional prohibition
found in Tennessee’s statute: “[p]romoting division between, or resentment of, a race, sex, religion, creed, nonviolent political aff iliation,
social class, or class of people.”34 The word “promoting” could reasonably be construed as presenting any historical event or account that
might elicit feelings of resentment or division. Thus, teaching about
the Civil War—which likely stokes at least some division and resentment among some students, particularly in the southern states—
could be banned under a broad interpretation of the provision.
Even many of the narrower statutes are subject to signif icant
danger of overbroad interpretations. Though the Idaho Code only
bans “direct[ing] or otherwise compel[ling] students to personally
aff irm, adopt, or adhere to” the ideas,35 it ventures into objectionably
vague territory by naming CRT explicitly as the source of the ideas it
seeks to ban36 and banning all distinctions among students on account
of race.37 The Idaho Code’s explicit naming of CRT may reasonably be
interpreted by a court to encompass all CRT ideas, including sharing
stories of how people of color have experienced racism. The ban on
distinguishing among students on account of race may hamper
schools’ ability to get underprivileged students the resources and support that they need. Overall, the Idaho legislation could pose a threat
depending on how courts interpret it. If courts take a broad reading of
the statute, it is far more susceptible to banning ideas that are important for educators to teach.
The Oklahoma statute is probably the broadest, especially in its
provision pertaining to higher education institutions. The Oklahoma
provision regarding higher education includes a blanket ban on “mandatory gender or sexual diversity training or counseling” and “[a]ny
orientation or requirement that presents any form of race or sex stereotyping or a bias on the basis of race or sex.”38 Even taken literally,
this ban completely prohibits any conversation in a mandatory setting
that acknowledges the lived experiences of people of color or that
even “presents” information about historical events involving “a racial

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(a)(10) (2021).
IDAHO CODE § 33-138(3)(a) (2021).
See id. § 33-138(2).
Id. § 33-138(3)(b).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(A)(1) (2021).
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bias.”39 This creates obvious conf licts with many universities’ standard practices in response to federal regulations such as those under
Title IX40 and Title VI.41
Thus, the bulk of the banned concepts may not immediately appear to be a threat to CRT theories or to the teaching of basic historical
events and culturally sustaining pedagogical practices. But many provisions are open to interpretations that could threaten culturally sustaining educators’ ability to do their job well.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS AND ACTIONS
Regardless of the danger of the statutes’ language alone, many of
the statutes provide opportunities for administrators to adopt the
broadest possible interpretations with the most oppressive consequences. For example, the Oklahoma statute grants authority to the
State Board of Education to promulgate rules,42 and the Oklahoma
State Board of Education implemented emergency rules implementing the bill quickly after it passed. The rules require districts to “adopt
policies and procedures, including incorporating into employee and
student handbooks, the requirements . . . . [to] notify individuals of the
right to f ile complaints . . . . [and to] ensure that the parent . . . of all
students . . . are annually notif ied of the non-discrimination requirements.”43 The rules further give parents “the right to inspect curriculum, instructional materials, classroom assignments, and lesson plans
to ensure compliance” and require the district “to report for each complaint f iled . . . to the State Department of Education within thirty (30)
days of resolution of the complaint.”44
These rules come with signif icant consequences for teachers and
schools deemed out of compliance. The new Oklahoma rules threaten
to suspend or revoke licenses of school off icials and to disaccredit

39. See id.
40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688; 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7. Though there does not appear to be a formal requirement for training university employees about Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, such trainings may be necessary to comply with the statute’s prohibition against
discrimination in education. See id.
42. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(B)(2) (2021) (“The State Board of Education shall promulgate rules, subject to approval by the Legislature, to implement the
provisions of this subsection.”).
43. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:10-1-23(g) (2021).
44. Id. §§ 210:10-1-23(e), (i).

2022]

F IGHTING ORTHODOXY

343

schools deemed out of compliance.45 Arizona also provides for “disciplinary action” and “suspension or revocation of [a] teacher’s certif icate” based on the board of education’s judgment—which may not
be as precise as a court’s.46 South Carolina legislation was part of an
appropriations bill and provides that no state funds can be used to
“carry out standards, curricula, lesson plans, textbooks, instructional
materials, or instructional materials that serve to inculcate” the common list of ideas.47 Interpreting this legislation broadly, the South Carolina Department of Education could completely cut off funding to
many schools.48 A proposed bill in Wisconsin even provides for a private cause of action and attorney’s fees if a school is found to be in
violation and mandates a ten percent reduction in state aid to that
school.49
This legislation could have an adverse impact on schools with
more students of color, which are naturally more likely to have conversations that could be deemed to violate the law.50 Regardless of any
disparate impact, all students are worse off when they are not exposed
to other cultures and ideas. All students will be far less prepared to
participate in a globalized society and navigate the rapidly increasing
diversity of the United States.51

45. Id. §§ 210:10-1-23(h), (j).
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-717.02(D) (2021).
47. H. 4100, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 124th Sess. § 1.105(6) (S.C. 2021).
48. See id.
49. S.B. 411, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2021).
50. This follows logically from the tendency of students and teachers to discuss
the students’ lived experiences and connect curriculum with students’ everyday lives.
The higher number of racial and ethnic minorities in the classroom, the more statistically likely it is that a student will share an experience that could engender guilt or
other uncomfortable feelings among White students. Further, teachers are logically
more likely to discuss concepts through the lens of differing identities when their classrooms are not majority White and homogeneous.
51. See William H. Frey, The Nation Is Diversifying Even Faster Than Predicted, According to New Census Data, BROOKINGS (July 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/new-census-data-shows-the-nation-is-diversifying-even-faster-than
-predicted [https://perma.cc/K3W2-XMTL] (highlighting the increasing diversity of
the United States); see also Ernest T. Pascarella, Georgianna L. Martin, Jana M. Hanson,
Teniell L. Trolian, Benjamin Gillig, & Charles Blaich, Effects of Diversity Experiences on
Critical Thinking Skill over 4 Years of College, 55 J. COLL. STUDENT DEV. 86, 86–92 (2014)
(studying benef its of diverse classrooms and conversations for critical thinking skills);
GARY ORF IELD & JONGYEON EE, OUR SEGREGATED CAPITAL: AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE CITY
WITH RACIALLY POLARIZED SCHOOLS 18 (2017), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/our-segregated-capital-an
-increasingly-diverse-city-with-racially-polarized-schools/POSTVERSION_DC_
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D. CHILLING EFFECT
More than anything, the chilling effect of the legislation is the primary concern. Particularly when paired with media rhetoric depicting
the statutes in their broadest form, the legislation has sparked fear in
educators that they will face legal repercussions by teaching something that may fall under their state’s prohibitions.52 In states with
CRT bans, teachers are likely to shy away from teaching concepts
through a lens that acknowledges race, sex, class, and other identif iers
and the way these identif iers shape everyday interactions.53 Some educators are even avoiding teaching objectively true historical events
that depict any sort of animosity or conf lict along lines of identity.54
Thus, educators, reasonably fearing a broad interpretation of these
bans, may not feel comfortable teaching critical aspects of U.S. history,
including ethnic cleansing of indigenous people, slavery, the Civil War,
reconstruction, Jim Crow, internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II, the Holocaust, the civil rights movement, the women’s
suffrage movement, and Stonewall—let alone current events and social science relating to current and persisting structures of inequity.
020117.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS9K-3KNH] (describing the importance of critical
thinking skills in an increasingly multiracial society).
52. See Meckler & Natanson, supra note 14.
53. See, e.g., Complaint at 2 ¶ 3, Black Emergency Response Team v. O’Connor, No.
5:21-cv-01022 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 19, 2021) (“The Act’s confounding language is not only
facially unconstitutional but its application has also chilled and censored speech that
strikes at the heart of public education and the nation’s democratic institutions. Educators at all levels are blacklisting books by diverse authors and adapting their instructional approaches to avoid raising complex questions about race and gender. District
administrators have struck texts by Black and women authors from their reading lists,
including To Kill a Mockingbird, Their Eyes Were Watching God, I Know Why the Caged
Bird Sings, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, and A Raisin in the Sun, while
leaving in place texts by White and male authors. Teachers have received guidance to
comply with H.B. 1775 by avoiding terms such as ‘diversity’ and ‘white privilege,’ while
administrators have simultaneously acknowledged that ‘no one truly knows what [the
Act] means or can come to agreement on its meaning.’ Professors have stopped testing
on certain theories related to the implications of race on society, and university librarians are afraid to purchase materials related to race and gender. In response to serious
complaints of racism and discrimination on its campus and to provide a safer climate
for all, the University of Oklahoma (“OU”) had required all students to participate in
sexual harassment training and diversity, equity, and inclusion coursework; but now,
OU is prohibited under the Act from mandating the training and coursework. Across
the state, educators are censoring their speech to avoid deeper student inquiry around
race, gender, and inequality because they do not know where the line between lawful
and unlawful conduct lies.”).
54. See, e.g., Meckler & Natanson, supra note 14 (“F lorida school off icials canceled
a lecture for teachers on the history of the civil rights movement while they considered
whether it would violate state rules.”).
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This legislation has a strong potential to deter and a fair potential
to punish instruction about historical events and social science that
acknowledges discrimination and conf lict along lines of identity.55
II. CHALLENGING CRT BANS IN THE COURTS
Anti-CRT legislation likely violates fundamental constitutional
principles, especially those in the F irst and Fourteenth Amendments.56 CRT bans are directly at odds with foundational Supreme
Court cases such as Pico57 and Meyer.58 Courts may f ind that legislatures’ motivations for the restriction on speech were impermissibly
nationalistic and political. Thus, there is a signif icant chance that the
legislation could be struck down as long as litigators can adequately
articulate the legislation’s harm.
A. F IRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
Courts may f ind that the legislation violates teachers’ F irst
Amendment rights to teach material they f ind to be academically important, and—perhaps more importantly—that it violates parents’
F irst Amendment rights to decide what is appropriate for their child
to learn.
In Pico, the Supreme Court held that a school board could not restrict the availability of library books simply because its members disagreed with their content.59 The board justif ied its actions saying that
the books were “anti-America, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just
plain f ilthy” and claiming that it was their “moral obligation[ ] to protect the children in [their] schools from this moral danger.”60 The
Court found that the board’s actions violated the F irst Amendment,
quoting Tinker v. Des Moines61 and stating that students do not “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
55. But see BERT Response, supra note 33, at 22 (“[T]he [Oklahoma] State Department of Education has stated that revocation of a license shall only proceed if the employee is found in ‘willful violation.’ . . . Therefore, Plaintiffs’ false specter of professional ruin is quashed through this scienter requirement. Teachers cannot be chilled
from instructing students on concepts unless they know those concepts are prohibited
. . . . [O]ffenders would have to willfully violate what they already understand as a prohibition.”).
56. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
57. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
58. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
59. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 457 U.S. at 872.
60. Id. at 857 (quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 474
F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
61. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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schoolhouse gate.”62 The Court broadly opined that schools should
prepare students for democratic life, noting that “just as access to
ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of
free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares
students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often
contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”63
Further, the Court noted that, while the board had signif icant discretion to determine the content of its libraries, the board could not
remove books from the library simply because it disliked the ideas
contained in the books; and it could not seek “by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion.’”64 Though the Court noted that its holding
was specif ic to libraries and suggested that school boards might rightfully claim more discretion over matters of curriculum, the principle
remains that legislators and school boards may not restrict speech in
schools for political or nationalistic reasons.65
Courts may reasonably analogize anti-CRT legislation to removal
of books from schools. The legislation bans specif ic ideas and is meant
to combat a particular ideology that conservatives have identif ied as
unorthodox and undesirable. In that sense, challengers of the legislation may successfully convince a court that the legislation attempts to
“prescribe what shall be orthodox.”66 Proponents of the legislation
may argue that Pico applies only to school libraries and not classrooms or curriculum,67 but challengers may note that several circuits
have already extended Pico to the context of curriculums.68 Thus, a
62. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 457 U.S. at 865 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
506).
63. Id. at 868.
64. Id. at 854 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
65. Id. at 864, 872.
66. Id. at 854 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
67. See, e.g., BERT Response, supra note 33, at 14 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968)) (“[A] State has the ‘undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools.’”). This quote is taken out of context by the defendants in
Black Emergency Response Team, as it reads in whole: “The State’s undoubted right to
prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientif ic theory or doctrine [, i.e.,
the theory of evolution,] where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the
F irst Amendment [, e.g., political or religious motivations]. It is much too late to argue
that the State may impose upon the teachers in its schools any conditions that it
chooses, however restrictive they may be of constitutional guarantees.” Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
68. See, e.g., Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631
(2d Cir. 2005); Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995); Pratt v.
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court may f ind that Pico is forceful authority against the anti-CRT legislation.
Challengers may also analogize anti-CRT legislation to Epperson
v. Arkansas, where the Supreme Court held that a law that banned
teaching the theory of evolution was unconstitutional.69 The Court
noted that there was “[n]o suggestion [that the] law may be justif ied
by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of
some of its citizens.”70 Though political motivations may not carry the
same weight of impermissibility as religious motivations, the two can
be analogized easily. Pluralism of political viewpoints is arguably as
important to American democracy as religious pluralism. Consequently, political motivations may also cause the prohibition to violate
the F irst Amendment.
Challengers of the legislation may also make a broader appeal to
the purpose of schools as “nurseries of democracy”71 and “marketplace[s] of ideas”72 and may illustrate the need for preparing students
to understand others’ “cultural values”73 and to deal “effectively and
intelligently”74 with dissent in “our open political system . . . to preserve freedom and independence.”75
Aside from broad appeals to pluralism and supporting democratic values, challengers may also argue that the legislation impinges
on teachers’ and students’ academic freedom by regulating what they

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 1982); Monteiro v. Tempe Union
High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998); Axson-F lynn v. Johnson, 356
F.3d 1277, 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004).
69. Epperson, 393 U.S. 97.
70. Id. at 107.
71. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021) (“[T]he school
itself has an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular expression . . . because America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy.”).
72. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (“The classroom is peculiarly
the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”) (alteration in original).
73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Schools are a] principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”).
74. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[Schools are vital for]
prepar[ing] citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”).
75. Id.
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can think about and evaluate.76 The Court has opined that the F irst
Amendment protects “the right to receive information and ideas.”77
The Court has also noted that teachers and students have the right “to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”78 Challengers may effectively convince the court that no state should be allowed
to totally prevent teachers and students from examining and analyzing an idea, even if the state is allowed to encourage teachers and students to reject the idea. In other words, challengers may allege F irst
Amendment violations for impingement on the right to receive information79 and for viewpoint-based restrictions on academic freedom.80
F irst Amendment challenges are most likely to be successful if
challengers illustrate the political and partisan purposes behind the
legislation. Proponents are unlikely to articulate any legitimate pedagogical objectives behind the legislation aside from shielding students
from discomfort or divisiveness,81 and evidence is likely abundant
76. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (espousing academic freedom as a “transcendent value” in the United States and noting that the F irst Amendment “does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom”).
77. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Bd. of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–68 (1982) (plurality opinion).
78. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
79. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 53, at 68–69 (alleging violation of F irst Amendment right to receive information in challenge to Oklahoma anti-CRT statute).
80. See, e.g., id. at 34–36, 69–71 (alleging (1) violation of F irst Amendment for
“Overbroad and Viewpoint-Based Restriction on Academic Freedom” and (2) facts to
support restrictions on academic freedom).
81. See, e.g., Stephen Kearse, GOP Lawmakers Intensify Effort to Ban Critical Race
Theory in Schools, STATELINE, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 14, 2021), https://www
.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/06/14/gop
-lawmakers-intensify-effort-to-ban-critical-race-theory-in-schools
[https://perma
.cc/NX8V-F LEE] (“Missouri state Rep. Brian Seitz, a Republican, said in a phone interview that teaching critical race theory in schools would create ‘another great divide in
America.’ He introduced a bill that would ban critical race theory from all publicly
funded schools, including universities . . . . Tennessee state Sen. Brian Kelsey also argued that critical race theory will split Americans. ‘Critical Race Theory creates divisions within classrooms and will cause irreversible damage to our children who hold
the future of our great country,’ . . . . [T]he critical race theory controversy has little
connection to existing curriculums or school district policies. There is no evidence that
critical race theory, as def ined by its originators, has been taught in any public school.
Nor has a school board in any state cited critical race theory as an element of its curriculum . . . . West Virginia state Sen. Mike Azinger, a Republican, demurred when asked
for specif ic evidence of critical race theory’s footprint in his state . . . . The critical race
theory cited by Republican lawmakers and conservative pundits is often nebulous,
comprising equity and diversity initiatives, workplace trainings, school curricula,
reading lists and selectively edited quotations of critical race theorists. ‘They don’t

2022]

F IGHTING ORTHODOXY

349

that politics and/or racial animus motivated legislators in any given
state.82 The more evidence of legislators’ political intent—or even racial animus, if possible—that challengers can collect, the more likely a
F irst Amendment challenge is to succeed.83
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
Challengers may also successfully argue that the legislation violates procedural due
process because it is unconstitutionally vague. In Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, the Court struck down a New York law aimed at combating communist ideologies in universities, holding it invalid in part
because it was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.84 The Court noted that teachers were unlikely to know
what constitutes the boundary between permissible utterances and
acts and “seditious” utterances and acts, which were banned by the
legislation.85 This lack of clarity about what was and was not illegal
under the statute prevented teachers from having the requisite notice
of what was prohibited, violating teachers’ right to due process.86
Challengers may argue that anti-CRT statutes are too vague for
teachers to be on notice of what is banned. Because many provisions
are unclear,87 teachers are unlikely to know where the line is between
teaching one of the banned ideas and not. Teachers who care about
name specif ic texts,’ said Adrienne Dixson, a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign professor of education, in a phone interview.”).
82. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 53, at 51–61 (documenting racial and political
rhetoric of legislators as part of F irst Amendment challenge to Oklahoma’s anti-CRT
statute); Reid Wilson, GOP Legislatures Target Critical Race Theory, HILL (May 5, 2021),
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/551977-gop-legislatures-target-critical
-race-theory [https://perma.cc/MRQ4-GVVK ] (“In Tennessee, the bill’s chief sponsor,
state Rep. John Ragan (R), castigated those who promote critical race theory as ‘seditious charlatans [who] would if they could destroy our heritage of ordered, individual
liberty under the rule of law, before our very eyes.’”).
83. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (“The State’s undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it
the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientif ic theory or
doctrine [i.e., the theory of evolution] where that prohibition is based upon reasons
that violate the F irst Amendment [e.g., political or religious reasons].”); Gonzalez v.
Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948 (D. Ariz. 2017) (holding political motivations, including
racial animus, made legislation impermissible); Complaint, supra note 53, at 51–61
(documenting racial and political rhetoric of legislators as part of F irst Amendment
challenge to Oklahoma’s anti-CRT statute).
84. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
85. Id. at 597–604.
86. Id.
87. See supra Part I.B.
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their students’ learning are likely to be forced to test an invisible line
between the permissible and impermissible, and they may suffer
harsh penalties as a result. In this circumstance, a court may f ind that
teachers do not have adequate notice of what is banned and therefore
have not been provided due process.88
C. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AS-APPLIED
CHALLENGES
Challengers may also f ight the legislation on substantive due process grounds as an impingement on parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children as they see f it. By the state deciding for parents whether their children can be exposed to contentious theories,
parents are deprived of this right.
In Meyer, the Supreme Court declared a Nebraska law that
banned teaching in German unconstitutional for violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 The Court emphasized the rights of both the parent and the teacher to determine what
students will be taught and opined that “[n]o emergency has arisen
which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed.”90 It ultimately held that
“the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to
any end within the competency of the state.”91
The legislatures have not clearly identif ied a harm that they are
trying to prevent. Commentators have primarily made vague nationalistic arguments painting CRT as unpatriotic or describing CRT as an
ideology that they disagree with and that must be stopped.92 Other
justif ications have focused on the fear that students will experience
negative mental effects from guilt or that the concepts create divisiveness.93 Some have made the conclusory argument that anti-CRT legis-

88. See Complaint, supra note 53, at 1, 6, 20–27, 66–68 (illustrating ambiguities
in Oklahoma statute and laying out an extensive due process argument based on
vagueness).
89. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
90. Id. at 403.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 53, at 51–56 (documenting Oklahoma legislators’ arguments for banning CRT).
93. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 33-138(2) (2021) (“The Idaho legislature f inds that tenets . . . often found in ‘critical race theory[ ]’ undermine the objectives of [respecting the
dignity of others, acknowledging the right of others to express differing opinions, and
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lation has the “legitimate pedagogical justif ication” of “protecting children from race and sex discrimination in school curriculum.”94 Overall, there are only tenuous justif ications for the censorship.
Like in Meyer, courts may f ind that legislatures have not demonstrated that the banned ideas are harmful enough to justify an infringement on the freedom of students, parents, and teachers. Savvy
challengers can frame the issue for courts to require that the state
show it has a legitimate interest that it is trying to protect or is trying
to prevent a genuine harm. Because most legislators focused on their
political disagreement with the ideas or fear that children might feel
uncomfortable or guilty from them, courts may f ind that states’ justif ications do not outweigh a parent’s right to control their child’s upbringing. Thus, courts could hold that the statutes are “arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency to the
state.”95
D. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS,
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT CHALLENGES
Substantive due process challenges on discriminatory intent
grounds are far less
likely to prevail, despite that many litigators will be drawn to
such arguments because of the racial nature of the legislation.96 Such
challenges will require a signif icant showing of discriminatory purpose that may be diff icult to produce.
To successfully overturn legislation on discriminatory intent
grounds, courts generally consider (1) whether the impact of the action bears more heavily on one race than another, (2) the historical
background of the decision, (3) the specif ic sequence of events leading
to the challenged action, (4) the defendant’s departures from normal
procedures or substantive conclusions, and (5) the relevant legislative
or administrative history.97
fostering and defending intellectual honesty and freedom of speech] and exacerbate
and inf lame divisions on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity, religion, color, national origin,
or other criteria in ways contrary to the unity of the nation . . . .”) (emphasis added);
BERT Response, supra note 33, at 9 (“HB 1775 attempts to make education in Oklahoma more inclusive, [sic] by prohibiting the inculcation of concepts that exclude and
demonize persons purely based on race and sex.”).
94. See BERT Response, supra note 33, at 2.
95. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
96. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 53, at 71–74 (alleging racially discriminatory
purpose in derogation of Fourteenth Amendment).
97. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
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Challengers may be able to show that the action bears more heavily on some races than others but will likely need to rely on theoretical
and anecdotal examples98—as it will be diff icult to show that not
teaching the specif ic banned ideas will harm specif ic groups. To satisfy the f irst factor, challengers must essentially be able to convince a
court through concrete research and analysis that harm to specif ic
groups has occurred or is likely to occur. Part III of this Essay discusses two avenues to do this. For the second factor, challengers may
provide a brief overview of historic segregation in their state and
frame the legislation in the context of historical attempts to resegregate.
Challengers may be able to demonstrate factors three, four, and
f ive if they compile evidence of the motivations for the decision, including suspect comments by legislators and unusual procedures by
legislatures. The complaint in Black Emergency Response Team (BERT)
provides a useful example in which challengers of the Oklahoma statute documented racial and political rhetoric in an attempt to illustrate
racial animus.99 The plaintiffs also emphasized that the Oklahoma
statute was passed on an emergency basis—illustrating the Oklahoma
legislature’s departure from normal proceedings to pass the statute—
and the Oklahoma Department of Education’s expedited measures implementing the legislation.100 Challengers may also emphasize departure from normal procedures by illustrating how similar decisions are
typically made by local school districts rather than at the state level.101
Plaintiffs have been successful with this argument when they
were able to compile overwhelming evidence of racial animus. In Gonzalez v. Douglas, plaintiffs successfully challenged a discriminatory
law designed to ban culturally relevant programming by collecting extensive records demonstrating discriminatory intent.102 Plaintiffs

98. See infra Part III.
99. Complaint, supra note 53, at 51–61 (documenting racial and political rhetoric
of legislators).
100. Id. at 49–51 (“The Oklahoma Legislature deviated from its own procedure to
pass H.B. 1775, in furtherance of its racial and partisan interests . . . . The law was
passed . . . on an emergency basis because representatives wanted to ensure it went
into effect for the upcoming school year. The legislature did not reference a particular
change in Oklahoma educational practices, either in the recent past or pending, that
the legislature needed to address on an emergency basis. All Republican members of
the legislature present and voting voted in favor of H.B. 1775; all Democratic members
present and voting voted against it.”).
101. See, e.g., id. at 56–58.
102. Gonzalez v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948 (D. Ariz. 2017).
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convinced the court that legislative proceedings were full of dog whistles103––including “Raza,” “un-American,” “radical,” “communist,” “Aztlán,” and “M.E.Ch.A.,” which operated as derogatory code words for
Mexican Americans.104 Plaintiffs also documented racial commentary
from the blog posts of the main proponent of the bill to show that it
was motivated by racial animus.105 Perhaps most importantly, plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that the act was specif ically targeted at
one racial group and one particular course by showing that the administrative enforcers of the statute—who were also the bill’s main proponents—”refused to believe” independent evidence that the course
was “academically excellent” and attempted to shut it down despite
that it had allowed other similar programs to continue.106
Making as strong of a showing as the Gonzalez plaintiffs is unlikely but possible. Challengers who track legislators’ Twitter posts
and delve into the specif ic enforcement decisions of departments of
education may f ind convincing evidence of racial animus and the targeting of specif ic groups. Challengers should place special emphasis
on legislators’ tendency to identify Black Lives Matter—a movement
obviously associated with one racial group—as the movement/ideology that legislators intend to target. The fact that the legislation was
passed as a reaction to a particular racial group’s social movement
could constitute circumstantial evidence of racial animus.
Ultimately, the success of a discriminatory intent claim is likely to
fall on the shock-value of the evidence of racial animus and whether
the court takes the states’ explanations about legislative purpose—
e.g., wanting to promote unity and combat divisiveness—at face value.
Challengers may experience some success if they can make a signif icant evidentiary showing that motivations behind the legislation
were political and racialized.
E. JUSTICIABILITY DEFENSE
F inally, some challengers may need to overcome a justiciability
defense by their state.

103. See Ian Olasov, Offensive Political Dog Whistles: You Know Them When You
Hear Them. Or Do You?, VOX (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/
11/7/13549154/dog-whistles-campaign-racism [https://perma.cc/HG2S-CUKN].
104. Gonzalez, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 967–68.
105. Id. at 968–72 (“Huppenthal’s blog comments provide the strongest evidence
that racial animus motivated . . . [the statute] . . . .”).
106. Id. at 972.
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Where a teacher or administrator has been f ired,107 of course,
states will have a diff icult time arguing that there is no harm giving
rise to the claim; but some challengers may have diff iculty f inding a
plaintiff in states where the legislation has not yet been implemented
or where educators have been unwilling to risk their livelihood.
Plaintiffs may f ind some success overcoming a justiciability defense if they are able to demonstrate the policy changes that the legislation has caused and show with particularity how this impacts the
classroom experience for students and teachers. The following section
attempts to articulate harms to overcome this barrier, but specif ic anecdotes from schools in the challengers’ states will be the most convincing.108
III. HARM TO STUDENTS
Because of Fourteenth Amendment and justiciability requirements, harm will be an important issue in litigation and will require
attorneys to suff iciently articulate the harm that anti-CRT statutes
cause. This is a diff icult task.
Some may argue that courts are highly unlikely to interpret the
statutes so broadly as to ban teaching the objective history of real
events without any analysis, and they are probably right. But teaching
history, art, literature, science, and more without analysis and acknowledgment of racial, gender, ethnic, and socioeconomic conf lict
has an undeniable disparate impact on students from marginalized
groups. Further, it robs all students—regardless of their identity—of
adequate skill development by encouraging watered-down, surfacelevel instruction that deemphasizes critical reasoning. This Part discusses these two broad harms—harm to culturally sustaining curriculum and harm to critical reasoning—in turn. The latter is illustrated
within the context of social studies standards representing the skills
students need to develop.
A. HARM TO CULTURALLY SUSTAINING CURRICULUM
As a way to combat the abysmal racial disparities in educational
outcomes,109 culturally sustaining pedagogy (previously called “culturally relevant pedagogy”) has become a commonly accepted best
107. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13.
108. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 53, at 2 (providing anecdotes of striking local
policy changes resulting from the anti-CRT legislation).
109. See Tyrone C. Howard & Andrea C. Rodriguez-Minkoff, Culturally Relevant
Pedagogy 20 Years Later: Progress or Pontif icating? What Have We Learned, and Where
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practice among educators.110 Gloria Ladson-Billings coined the term
after studying a small number of talented educators who experienced
outstanding success in classrooms of primarily Black students.111
Since then, educators have come to widely understand the need to “focus[ ] on student learning and academic achievement versus classroom and behavior management, cultural competence versus cultural
assimilation or eradication, and sociopolitical consciousness rather
than school-based tasks that have no beyond-school application” in
order to allow students to “take both responsibility for and deep interest in their education.”112
This need for culturally sustaining pedagogy necessarily involves
acknowledging, studying, and analyzing cultural differences. For culturally sustaining pedagogy to be successful, teachers must go beyond
just focusing on “achievement and cultural competence.” Instead, “students must develop a broader sociopolitical consciousness that allows
them to critique the cultural norms, values, mores, and institutions
that produce and maintain social inequities.”113 Considering a student’s culture and identity when choosing the content and form of

Do We Go?, TCHRS. COLL. REC., Jan. 1, 2017, at 2–4 (collecting disparities).
110. Culturally relevant pedagogy was a term coined by Gloria Ladson-Billings, a
professor of education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who had set out to
identify the techniques that worked for successful teachers of Black students. See generally Gloria Ladson-Billings, Like Lightning in a Bottle: Attempting to Capture the Pedagogical Excellence of Successful Teachers of Black Students, 3 INT’ J. QUALITATIVE STUD.
EDUC. 335 (1990); Gloria Ladson-Billings, Toward a Theory of Culturally Relevant Pedagogy, 32 AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 465 (1995). Ladson-Billings’ theory quickly became a foundational theory for educational best-practice, particularly for educating students of
color. This theory has been referenced thousands of times by education scholars. See,
e.g., Gloria Ladson-Billings, Culturally Relevant Pedagogy 2.0: A.k.a The Remix, 84 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 74 (2014) (ref lecting on the wide use and inf luence of the author’s original
theory of culturally relevant pedagogy, identifying misconceptions about the theory,
and proposing a change in terminology to “culturally sustaining pedagogy”); Search for
“Culturally Relevant Pedagogy” or “Culturally Sustaining Pedagogy,” GOOGLE SCHOLAR,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C24&q=%22culturally+
relevant+pedagogy%22+or+%22culturally+sustaining+pedagogy%22&btnG= (last
visited Apr. 4, 2022) (returning 2,630 results in a Google Scholar search narrowed to
the specif ic phrases “culturally relevant pedagogy” and “culturally sustaining pedagogy”).
111. See Ladson-Billings, supra note 110, at 335–44; GLORIA LADSON-BILLINGS,
DREAMKEEPERS: SUCCESSFUL TEACHERS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN (1994); LadsonBillings, supra note 110, at 465–91.
112. Ladson-Billings, supra note 110, at 76–77.
113. Gloria Ladson-Billings, But That’s Just Good Teaching! The Case for Culturally
Relevant Pedagogy, 34 THEORY INTO PRAC. 159, 162 (1995).
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pedagogy is vital for motivating students, and it impacts student outcomes tremendously.114 Though it is diff icult to empirically capture
the impacts of culturally sustaining pedagogy, numerous studies have
found tremendous benef its for educational equity.115 Culturally sustaining pedagogy is thus vital for the reduction of severe educational
disparities.
Pedagogy that acknowledges and analyzes systemic racism and
sociopolitical conf licts across lines of identity is also crucial for developing citizens who will become positive democratic participants. Put
another way: “[i]f school is about preparing students for active citizenship, what better citizenship tool than the ability to critically analyze the society?”116 Thus, the benef its of culturally sustaining pedagogy span beyond just reducing disparities in education; it ultimately
creates a more equitable and vibrant society for all citizens.
The anti-CRT legislation threatens signif icant harm to aspects of
culturally sustaining pedagogy. Far from just limiting harmful ideology, the effect of the legislation is to discourage practices that both reduce educational disparities and create a more vibrant, democratic society.
B. HARM TO CRITICAL REASONING & NEW SOCIAL STUDIES STANDARDS
Anti-CRT legislation also threatens signif icant harm to students’
opportunity to learn the critical reasoning skills necessary to thrive in
a diverse society. In some anti-CRT states, students may receive instruction about important historical events; but, in several anti-CRT
states, teachers who attempt to meet nationally respected standards
are in danger of violating anti-CRT statutes.
Some statutes attempt to preclude the argument that the legislation harms academic standards by providing that their legislation will
not prohibit the teaching of concepts that align to the state’s academic
standards. Tennessee allows “impartial discussion of controversial aspects of history” and “impartial instruction on the historical oppression of a particular group of people”—though it does not address current events.117 New Hampshire specif ies that “[n]othing . . . shall be
construed to prohibit discussing . . . the historical existence of ideas

114. See generally Tyrone C. Howard, Powerful Pedagogy for African American Students: A Case of Four Teachers, 36 J. URB. EDUC. 179 (2001).
115. See Howard & Rodriguez-Minkoff, supra note 109, at 11–15.
116. Ladson-Billings, supra note 113.
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(b)(2), (3) (2021).
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and subjects identif ied in this section.”118 Oklahoma has provided that
“[t]he provisions of this subsection shall not prohibit the teaching of
concepts that align to the Oklahoma Academic Standards.”119 This may
provide some room for teachers to address important historical
events and to “analyze” and “evaluate” those events.120
The Oklahoma standards provide room for sixth graders, whose
studies focus on geography, to “[i]dentify and describe cultural traits
of language, ethnic heritage, religion, and traditions practiced among
peoples”121 and to “[a]nalyze reasons for conf lict and cooperation
among and between groups, societies, nations, and regions.”122 Seventh graders, who focus on world studies, are allowed to “[d]escribe
how cultural diffusion, both voluntary and forced, impact society” and
“[d]escribe how political, economic, and cultural forces challenge contemporary political arrangements.”123 The eighth-grade standards,
which are meant to teach U.S. history, ask teachers to address slavery,
the Civil War, and Jim Crow.124 And high school U.S. history discusses
post-Reconstruction civil rights struggles,125 the Civil Rights movement (including comparing its ideologies),126 and even “the ongoing
issues to be addressed by the Donald Trump and subsequent administrations, including taxation, immigration, employment, climate
change, race relations, religious discrimination and bigotry, civic engagement, and perceived biases in the media.”127
If courts construe these standards broadly, teachers can probably
teach any historical event so long as they refrain from assigning blame
or guilt on students for any of these events,128 but teachers are also in
danger of being caught in a catch-22 where they have a duty to teach
in adherence with the standards but do not have enough clarity about
118. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:40(II) (2021) (2021); see also IOWA CODE §
261H.8(4)(f ) (2021) (“This statute shall not be construed to . . . : (f ) Prohibit the use of
curriculum that teaches the topics of sexism, slavery, [and] racial oppression . . . .”).
119. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(B) (2021).
120. See generally OKLAHOMA ACADEMIC STANDARDS FOR SOCIAL STUDIES, OKLA. STATE
DEP’T OF EDUC. (2019), https://sde.ok.gov/sites/default/f iles/documents/f iles/
Oklahoma%20Academic%20Standards%20for%20Social%20Studies%205.21.19
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AAM-C9D5].
121. Id. at 27, objective 6.3.2.
122. Id. at 28, objective 6.5.5.
123. Id. at 31, objectives 7.5.2, 7.5.7.
124. See id. at 32–40.
125. See id. at 58–59, USH.1.2, USH.2.1.
126. See id. at 64, USH.7.1.
127. Id. at 66, USH.9.3 (emphasis added).
128. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-157(B)(1)(f )–(h) (2021).
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what is prohibited to comfortably do so without fear of violating the
law.129
Further, most states do not have this exception. South Carolina
explicitly bans discussion of the concepts even to “carry out standards,”130 and Idaho and Arizona do not provide any exceptions when
the bans conf lict with curriculum or standards.131 In these states, the
legislation is likely to conf lict with the state’s own standards and is
almost certain to conf lict with any standards ref lecting national best
practices.
The National Curriculum Standards for Social Studies, promulgated by the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS), have ten
themes—many of which conf lict with broad interpretations of the
CRT bans.132 Themes one, four, and f ive––respectively titled “Culture”;
“Individual Development and Identity”; and “Individuals, Groups, and
Institutions”—all have the potential to conf lict with CRT bans.133
A comparison between anti-CRT legislation and Minnesota’s proposed social studies standards—which are designed to ref lect the updated NCSS standards—is instructive.134 The proposed standards consist of f ive strands: Citizenship and Government (Standards 1–6),
Economics (Standards 7–12), Geography (Standards 13–17), History
(Standards 18–21), and Ethnic Studies (Standards 22–24).135 There is
certainly potential conf lict between the anti-CRT legislation and several of the citizenship and government standards, economics standards, and—of course—ethnic studies standards. But the geography
and history standards are arguably most instructive, as they are the
most foundational and generalizable to any state.

129. See supra Part II.B.
130. H. 4100, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 124th Sess., § 1.105 (S.C. 2021).
131. See IDAHO CODE § 33-138 (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1494 (2021).
132. See National Curriculum Standards for Social Studies, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR THE
SOC. STUD., https://www.socialstudies.org/standards/national-curriculum-standards
-social-studies-introduction [https://perma.cc/GSJ5-3QMY]. These standards have
been carefully crafted by the NCSS to guide states in adopting social studies standards
for “the promotion of civic competence—the knowledge, intellectual processes, and
democratic dispositions required of students to be active and engaged participants in
public life.” Id. The NCSS is “the largest professional association in the country devoted
solely to social studies education.” About, NAT’L CONF. FOR THE SOC. STUD.,
https://www.socialstudies.org/about [https://perma.cc/W2F7-JUZE].
133. See id.
134. 2021 Minnesota K-12 Academic Standards in Social Studies Draft Three,
Minn. Dep’t of Educ. (proposed Nov. 15, 2021).
135. Id.
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1. Geography Standards
Standard F ifteen asks students to “[a]nalyze patterns of movement and interconnectedness among different peoples within and between cultural, economic, and political systems from a local to a global
scale.”136 While this may not appear to necessarily conf lict with any
banned ideas, a closer look at the ninth-grade benchmarks under this
standard reveal a requirement to teach concepts that might breed resentment and/or guilt among students. One benchmark requires students to “[e]xplain migration patterns, including forced migration and
displacement . . . at a range of scales, local to global.”137 To understand
modern forced migration and displacement, students must know undocumented immigration and deportation, ethnic cleansing, refugees,
and more—and this knowledge is likely to make most empathetic students feel uncomfortable. Another benchmark requires analysis of
how “global capital and technologies were used to shape the global
wealth distribution and the legacies of subordinate and dominant
powers that have existed in the world . . . .”138 A teacher will likely
struggle to address this standard without students noticing the high
correlation of race and sex with wealth both locally and globally; and
students, upon noticing this fact, are likely to feel some amount of
guilt, anguish, or responsibility.139 Further, students may organically
arrive at a conclusion that meritocracy was created by one group to
oppress other groups—an idea banned by several of the anti-CRT statutes.140
Standard Seventeen asks students to “[i]nvestigate how sense of
place is impacted by different cultural perspectives.”141 As applied to
high school students, this standard requires “[e]xplain[ing] the social
construction of race and how it was used to oppress people of color
and assess[ing] how social policies and economic forces offer privilege
or systemic oppressions for racial/ethnic groups related to accessing
social, political, economic and special opportunities.”142 Meeting this
benchmark almost undoubtedly requires violating an anti-CRT stat-

136. Id. passim.
137. Id. at 74, Benchmark 9.3.15.3.
138. Id. at Benchmark 9.3.15.5.
139. This has the potential to violate at least f ive statutes that ban concepts that
engender feelings of guilt. See supra notes 32–33and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1494(D)(7).
141. 2021 Minnesota K-12 Academic Standards in Social Studies Draft Three,
Minn. Dep’t of Educ. passim (proposed Nov. 15, 2021).
142. Id. at 76, Benchmark 9.3.17.3.
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ute. It is near impossible for students to understand power and privilege and its relationship to race without creating, at minimum, discomfort in White students. Exploring the difference in access to social,
political, economic, and special opportunities requires teachers to at
least acknowledge the existence of discrimination in a way that would
subject them to punishment under some states’ statutes.
2. History Standards
Standard Eighteen seems to almost directly address anti-CRT
statutes and their historical analogs by setting a goal that students are
able to “[a]sk historical questions about context, change and continuity in order to identify and analyze dominant and non-dominant narratives about the past.”143 Teachers could conceivably address this
standard by discussing the rise of anti-CRT statutes, asking students
to recognize their historical context—an increasingly diverse society
breeding racial resentment and a political movement giving voice to
these repressed feelings—and evaluate how some states are attempting to create a dominant narrative and suppress a non-dominant narrative by banning certain concepts. Of course, meeting this standard
is likely to make some individuals feel discomfort or guilt, so it is likely
banned under the institutionalized narrative created by anti-CRT statutes.
Similarly, Standard Nineteen asks students to “[i]dentify diverse
points of view and describe how one’s frame of reference inf luences
historical perspective.”144 Legislators who have supported anti-CRT
statutes cannot plausibly support this standard, as they are explicitly
attempting to suppress points of view that diverge from their own.
Thus, students are likely doomed to receive lower-quality instruction if their teachers are fearful of the conf lict between many social studies academic standards and anti-CRT statutes in their states.
This harm to students may not be immediately obvious, but the longterm impact will be a generation of students with underdeveloped
critical reasoning and discernment skills—even more necessary in the
globalized and information-saturated world of today—and little respect for pluralism and dissent.

143. Id. passim.
144. Id. passim.
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CONCLUSION
Though the plain language of anti-CRT statutes may not appear
threatening, the statutes pose signif icant danger because of their ambiguous language allowing for broad interpretations—especially
broad interpretations by state administrative agencies—and their
chilling effect on teachers. These statutes can and should be challenged on F irst Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, but
such challenges will require suff icient articulation of the statutes’
harms. Litigators should gather evidence of harms to students and
teachers from the legislation—particularly if such evidence tends to
show any disparities between groups of students. Evidence of the legislation’s chilling effect will be especially persuasive; and, where feasible, empirical studies should be commissioned to examine the impact on student outcomes. It may be easy to show harm to teachers
who are f ired or have their licenses revoked; but, in the probable absence of clear empirical evidence of harm to students, litigators should
be prepared to produce circumstantial evidence of these harms. Evidence of teachers who have been deterred or outright barred from
teaching specif ic books, units, historical events, or courses will be
helpful.145 This will demonstrate the signif icant harms to the ability to
teach culturally sustaining curriculums and to students’ opportunity
to develop the critical reasoning skills necessary to thrive in a diversifying and globalizing society.
Ultimately, litigators will have to read their state’s anti-CRT statute closely and should work with clients to create compelling narratives about the change in their classroom as a result of the statute’s
passage.

145. See, e.g., Meckler & Natanson, supra note 14.

